6-26-15
OBERGEFELL ET AL. v. HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL.
"No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies
the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice,
and family. In forming a marital union, two people become
something greater than once they were. As some of
the petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage
embodies a love that may endure even past death. It
would misunderstand these men and women to say they
disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that they do
respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its
fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned
to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s
oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the
eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit is reversed."
To read more about this important decision go to the white house website.
6-26-15
JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
"We hold that imposing an increased sentence under the
residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act violates
the Constitution’s guarantee of due process. Our contrary
holdings in James and Sykes are overruled. Today’s decision
does not call into question application of the Act to
the four enumerated offenses, or the remainder of the
Act’s definition of a violent felony.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion."
6-25-15
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
COMMUNITY AFFAIRS ET AL. v. INCLUSIVE
COMMUNITIES PROJECT, INC., ET AL.
"The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion." (Disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing
Act.)
6-25-15
KING ET AL. v. BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.
"The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit is
Affirmed." (Section 36B’s tax credits are available to individuals in States
that have a Federal Exchange)
6-22-15
KIMBLE ET AL. v. MARVEL ENTERTAINMENT, LLC,
SUCCESSOR TO MARVEL ENTERPRISES, INC.
"What we can decide, we can undecide. But stare decisis
teaches that we should exercise that authority sparingly.
Cf. S. Lee and S. Ditko, Amazing Fantasy No. 15: “SpiderMan,”
p. 13 (1962) (“[I]n this world, with great power
there must also come—great responsibility”). Finding
many reasons for staying the stare decisis course and no
“special justification” for departing from it, we decline
Kimble’s invitation to overrule Brulotte.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed."
(Court does not overrule Brulotte v. Thys
Co., 379 U. S. 29, in which this Court held that a patentee cannot
continue to receive royalties for sales made after his patent expires.)
6-22-15
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA v. PATEL ET AL.
"For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the Ninth
Circuit that §41.49(3)(a) is facially invalid insofar as it
fails to provide any opportunity for precompliance review
before a hotel must give its guest registry to the police for
inspection. Accordingly, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit
is affirmed."
(Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that inspections of hotel records under
§41.49(3)(a) are Fourth Amendment searches and that such searches
are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because hotel owners
are subjected to punishment for failure to turn over their records
without first being afforded the opportunity for precompliance review.)
6-22-15
KINGSLEY v. HENDRICKSON ET AL.
"In this case, an individual detained in a jail prior to trial
brought a claim under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983,
against several jail officers, alleging that they used excessive
force against him, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The officers concede
that they intended to use the force that they used. But
the parties disagree about whether the force used was
excessive.
The question before us is whether, to prove an excessive
force claim, a pretrial detainee must show that the officers
were subjectively aware that their use of force was unreasonable,
or only that the officers’ use of that force was
objectively unreasonable. We conclude that the latter
standard is the correct one."
Held: Under 42 U. S. C. §1983, a pretrial detainee must show only
that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively
unreasonable to prevail on an excessive force claim.
6-18-15
WALKER, CHAIRMAN, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF
MOTOR VEHICLES BOARD, ET AL. v. TEXAS
DIVISION, SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS,
INC., ET AL.
"Texas’s specialty license plate designs constitute government
speech, and thus Texas was entitled to refuse to issue plates featuring
SCV’s proposed design."
"The determination that Texas’s specialty license plate designs
are government speech does not mean that the designs do not also
implicate the free speech rights of private persons. The Court has
acknowledged that drivers who display a State’s selected license
plate designs convey the messages communicated through those designs.
See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 717, n. 15. The Court
has also recognized that the First Amendment stringently limits a
State’s authority to compel a private party to express a view with
which the private party disagrees. Just as Texas cannot require SCV
to convey “the State’s ideological message,” id., at 715, SCV cannot
force Texas to include a Confederate battle flag on its specialty license
plates."
6-18-15
MCFADDEN v. UNITED STATES
"When a controlled substance is an analogue, §841(a)(1) requires
the Government to establish that the defendant knew he was dealing
with a substance regulated under the Controlled Substances Act or
Analogue Act."
"We hold that §841(a)(1) requires the Government to
establish that the defendant knew he was dealing with “a
controlled substance.” When the substance is an analogue,
that knowledge requirement is met if the defendant
knew that the substance was controlled under the CSA or
the Analogue Act, even if he did not know its identity. The
knowledge requirement is also met if the defendant knew
2 MCFADDEN v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
the specific features of the substance that make it a “‘controlled
substance analogue.’” §802(32)(A). Because the
U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit approved a
jury instruction that did not accurately convey this
knowledge requirement, we vacate its judgment and remand
for that court to determine whether the error was
harmless."
6-15-15
NOEL REYES MATA, PETITIONER v. LORETTA E.
LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL
"An alien ordered to leave the country has a statutory
right to file a motion to reopen his removal proceedings.
See 8 U. S. C. §1229a(c)(7)(A). If immigration officials
deny that motion, a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction
to consider a petition to review their decision. See
Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 242, 253 (2010). Notwithstanding
that rule, the court below declined to take
jurisdiction over such an appeal because the motion to
reopen had been denied as untimely. We hold that was
error."
6-15-15
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P. ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
ASARCO LLC
"Section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code allows bankruptcy
trustees to hire attorneys, accountants, and other
professionals to assist them in carrying out their statutory
duties. 11 U. S. C. §327(a). Another provision, §330(a)(1),
states that a bankruptcy court “may award . . . reasonable
compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by”
those professionals. The question before us is whether
§330(a)(1) permits a bankruptcy court to award attorney’s
fees for work performed in defending a fee application in
court. We hold that it does not and therefore affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals."
6-15-15
KERRY, SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL. v. DIN
"Respondent Fauzia Din petitioned to have her husband, Kanishka Berashk,
a resident citizen of Afghanistan and former civil servant in
the Taliban regime, classified as an “immediate relative” entitled to
priority immigration status. Din’s petition was approved, but Berashk’s
visa application was ultimately denied. A consular officer informed
Berashk that he was inadmissible under §1182(a)(3)(B),
which excludes aliens who have engaged in “[t]errorist activities,” but
the officer provided no further information. Unable to obtain a more
detailed explanation for Berashk’s visa denial, Din filed suit in Federal
District Court, which dismissed her complaint. The Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that Din had a protected liberty interest in her
marriage that entitled her to review of the denial of Berashk’s visa.
It further held that the Government deprived her of that liberty interest
without due process when it denied Berashk’s visa application
without providing a more detailed explanation of its reasons.
Held: The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded."
"Because Fauzia Din was not deprived of “life, liberty, or
property” when the Government denied Kanishka Berashk
admission to the United States, there is no process due to
her under the Constitution. To the extent that she received
any explanation for the Government’s decision, this
was more than the Due Process Clause required. The
judgment of the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings."
6-1-15
MELLOULI v. LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL
"Mellouli’s Kansas conviction for concealing unnamed pills in his
sock did not trigger removal under §1227(a)(2)(B)(i)."
6-1-15
BANK OF AMERICA, N. A. v. CAULKETT
"A debtor in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding may not void a
junior mortgage lien under §506(d) when the debt owed on a senior
mortgage lien exceeds the current value of the collateral if the creditor’s
claim is both secured by a lien and allowed under §502 of the
Bankruptcy Code."
