OBERGEFELL ET AL. v. HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL.
"No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two people become something greater than once they were. As some of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may endure even past death. It would misunderstand these men and women to say they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed."
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JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
"We hold that imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act violates the Constitution’s guarantee of due process. Our contrary holdings in James and Sykes are overruled. Today’s decision does not call into question application of the Act to the four enumerated offenses, or the remainder of the Act’s definition of a violent felony. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS ET AL. v. INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES PROJECT, INC., ET AL.
"The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion." (Disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.)
KING ET AL. v. BURWELL, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL.
"The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is Affirmed." (Section 36B’s tax credits are available to individuals in States that have a Federal Exchange)
KIMBLE ET AL. v. MARVEL ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, SUCCESSOR TO MARVEL ENTERPRISES, INC.
"What we can decide, we can undecide. But stare decisis teaches that we should exercise that authority sparingly. Cf. S. Lee and S. Ditko, Amazing Fantasy No. 15: “SpiderMan,” p. 13 (1962) (“[I]n this world, with great power there must also come—great responsibility”). Finding many reasons for staying the stare decisis course and no “special justification” for departing from it, we decline Kimble’s invitation to overrule Brulotte. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed."
(Court does not overrule Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U. S. 29, in which this Court held that a patentee cannot continue to receive royalties for sales made after his patent expires.)
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA v. PATEL ET AL.
"For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that §41.49(3)(a) is facially invalid insofar as it fails to provide any opportunity for precompliance review before a hotel must give its guest registry to the police for inspection. Accordingly, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit is affirmed."
(Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that inspections of hotel records under §41.49(3)(a) are Fourth Amendment searches and that such searches are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because hotel owners are subjected to punishment for failure to turn over their records without first being afforded the opportunity for precompliance review.)
KINGSLEY v. HENDRICKSON ET AL.
"In this case, an individual detained in a jail prior to trial brought a claim under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, against several jail officers, alleging that they used excessive force against him, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The officers concede that they intended to use the force that they used. But the parties disagree about whether the force used was excessive. The question before us is whether, to prove an excessive force claim, a pretrial detainee must show that the officers were subjectively aware that their use of force was unreasonable, or only that the officers’ use of that force was objectively unreasonable. We conclude that the latter standard is the correct one."
Held: Under 42 U. S. C. §1983, a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable to prevail on an excessive force claim.
WALKER, CHAIRMAN, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES BOARD, ET AL. v. TEXAS DIVISION, SONS OF CONFEDERATE VETERANS, INC., ET AL.
"Texas’s specialty license plate designs constitute government speech, and thus Texas was entitled to refuse to issue plates featuring SCV’s proposed design."
"The determination that Texas’s specialty license plate designs are government speech does not mean that the designs do not also implicate the free speech rights of private persons. The Court has acknowledged that drivers who display a State’s selected license plate designs convey the messages communicated through those designs. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 717, n. 15. The Court has also recognized that the First Amendment stringently limits a State’s authority to compel a private party to express a view with which the private party disagrees. Just as Texas cannot require SCV to convey “the State’s ideological message,” id., at 715, SCV cannot force Texas to include a Confederate battle flag on its specialty license plates."
MCFADDEN v. UNITED STATES
"When a controlled substance is an analogue, §841(a)(1) requires the Government to establish that the defendant knew he was dealing with a substance regulated under the Controlled Substances Act or Analogue Act."
"We hold that §841(a)(1) requires the Government to establish that the defendant knew he was dealing with “a controlled substance.” When the substance is an analogue, that knowledge requirement is met if the defendant knew that the substance was controlled under the CSA or the Analogue Act, even if he did not know its identity. The knowledge requirement is also met if the defendant knew 2 MCFADDEN v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court the specific features of the substance that make it a “‘controlled substance analogue.’” §802(32)(A). Because the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit approved a jury instruction that did not accurately convey this knowledge requirement, we vacate its judgment and remand for that court to determine whether the error was harmless."
NOEL REYES MATA, PETITIONER v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL
"An alien ordered to leave the country has a statutory right to file a motion to reopen his removal proceedings. See 8 U. S. C. §1229a(c)(7)(A). If immigration officials deny that motion, a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction to consider a petition to review their decision. See Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 242, 253 (2010). Notwithstanding that rule, the court below declined to take jurisdiction over such an appeal because the motion to reopen had been denied as untimely. We hold that was error."
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P. ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ASARCO LLC
"Section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code allows bankruptcy trustees to hire attorneys, accountants, and other professionals to assist them in carrying out their statutory duties. 11 U. S. C. §327(a). Another provision, §330(a)(1), states that a bankruptcy court “may award . . . reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by” those professionals. The question before us is whether §330(a)(1) permits a bankruptcy court to award attorney’s fees for work performed in defending a fee application in court. We hold that it does not and therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals."
KERRY, SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL. v. DIN
"Respondent Fauzia Din petitioned to have her husband, Kanishka Berashk, a resident citizen of Afghanistan and former civil servant in the Taliban regime, classified as an “immediate relative” entitled to priority immigration status. Din’s petition was approved, but Berashk’s visa application was ultimately denied. A consular officer informed Berashk that he was inadmissible under §1182(a)(3)(B), which excludes aliens who have engaged in “[t]errorist activities,” but the officer provided no further information. Unable to obtain a more detailed explanation for Berashk’s visa denial, Din filed suit in Federal District Court, which dismissed her complaint. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Din had a protected liberty interest in her marriage that entitled her to review of the denial of Berashk’s visa. It further held that the Government deprived her of that liberty interest without due process when it denied Berashk’s visa application without providing a more detailed explanation of its reasons. Held: The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded."
"Because Fauzia Din was not deprived of “life, liberty, or property” when the Government denied Kanishka Berashk admission to the United States, there is no process due to her under the Constitution. To the extent that she received any explanation for the Government’s decision, this was more than the Due Process Clause required. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings."
MELLOULI v. LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL
"Mellouli’s Kansas conviction for concealing unnamed pills in his sock did not trigger removal under §1227(a)(2)(B)(i)."
BANK OF AMERICA, N. A. v. CAULKETT
"A debtor in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding may not void a junior mortgage lien under §506(d) when the debt owed on a senior mortgage lien exceeds the current value of the collateral if the creditor’s claim is both secured by a lien and allowed under §502 of the Bankruptcy Code."